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Abstract 
We argue that logical expressions in human language enable speakers to perform 
particular acts as well as stating propositions which may be true or false. We present a 
conversational action planning model of co-ordinated reasoning, which we use to 
predict choice of logical expressions in situations in which two people co-operate in the 
face of risk and uncertainty. We first show how this model predicts preferences for 
formulations of conditional directives where a principal instructs an agent on how to 
behave in a hypothetical situation. Second, we show how this model accounts for 
choices of quantity and probability expressions that express risk, in situations where a 
professional advises a client on her options. We conclude that the pragmatic signals 
encoded in human logical vocabulary can facilitate the co-ordination of social 
interaction through aiding mutual recognition of intentions on joint projects where 
collaboration is likely to create value. 
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How to Do Things with Logical Expressions: 
Creating Collective Value through Co-ordination 
 
 
In 1776, the eminent economist and philosopher Adam Smith pointed out the 
importance of the division of labour for modern society: Without humans’ capacity for 
specialising in tasks and collaborating with strangers, humankind would not enjoy 
anything near the success that it does. Somehow, without any explicit direction or 
centralised planning, human societies seem to be able to self-organise and re-organise 
into ever more successful economic and social arrangements (Seabright, 2004).Human 
societies thus seem to be able to make “collective minds” that maximise collective 
benefits for groups and enable them to prosper. How are such co-ordinated actions 
possible when many of the agents involved have never met in a face-to-face encounter? 
As well as famously invoking the action of an “invisible hand” to regulate 
markets, Smith argued that this achievement depends on use of language, coupled with 
the human inclination to exchange goods (in Smith’s words, their tendency “to truck 
and to barter”). Contemporary comparative psychology indeed paints a picture which is 
broadly in the spirit of Smith’s speculation. Thus Tomasello et al. (in press) argues that 
humans, when compared to chimpanzees, have a tendency to enjoy sharing with others, 
which applies to both goods and information. Dessalles (2000) agrees that the human 
species has a unique disposition to give information to others – but argues that this is 
mainly because individuals wish to signal their worth as a coalition partner to others.  
Overall and perhaps unsurprisingly, these arguments suggest that language and 
communication play a central role in the creation of collective value. More strikingly, 
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the seemingly least bartering- laden use of language, the language of wisdom itself,  
plays a role in achieving the social co-ordination of intentions. In this article, we show 
that logical expressions such as conditionals, quantifiers and probability words serve 
important social functions that facilitate co-ordinated reasoning and action.  
In particular, we demonstrate that logical vocabulary is impregnated with 
pragmatic signals—i.e. meanings that express the speaker’s intentions and beliefs in the 
particular contexts in which they are uttered—which facilitate communication and 
collective planning to deal with risk and uncertainty. From this pragmatic perspective, 
logical vocabulary obeys a logic of goal satisfaction (cf. Kenny, 1966) which is quite 
different to the truth-functional criteria used to judge the correctness of a logical 
expression. Consider the proposition “if you see a leopard, then you run for your life”. 
This is a logical proposition of the form “if p then q”. From a truth-functional 
perspective, this is a true statement unless there are protagonists in some implied 
reference group (e.g. a tribe in Kenya) who choose not to run for their life (not-q) even 
though they see a leopard (p). Yet suppose this statement is uttered by a safari guide to 
inexperienced tourists in Kenya. In such a context, it is manifest that the safari guide 
does more than merely express a proposition that may be true or false of a given 
reference class of people (or animals); rather, he wants to make his listeners behave in a 
certain way should a certain situation arise.  Such pragmatic functions are governed by 
social rationality, and the their quality is measured by the effectiveness with which they 
induce successful co-ordination through getting hearers to fulfil the speaker’s intentions, 
e.g. by indeed running away when they have spotted a leopard. 
We will illustrate our thesis with respect to empirical studies that consider two 
kinds of work situation requiring co-ordinated social interactions. The first study, on 
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conditional instructions, examines an oft-observed case of co-ordination of activity (in 
work situations but also, e.g., in parent-child relationships): a principal directs an agent 
on how to behave as she desires in hypothetical situations. The second study, on 
quantifiers and probability expressions, examines situations of relationship equality, 
where an expert professional has to give useful advice to a client who has the ultimate 
power of decision. We present a conversational action planning model that predicts 
ways of formulating felicitous conditional instructions and advice using quantifiers and 
probability expressions; that is, instructions and advice which adequately communicate 
the intentions of the speakers and produce the appropriate effect on the listener. 
Co-ordinated Planning and Social Control in the Face of Risk 
Human reasoning and rationality is embedded in – and may have emerged from – 
successful social communication. Other primates communicate and recognise intentions 
successfully, as when a dominant animal intimidates and inferior, and in this sense 
satisfy Gricean criteria for intentional communication (Grice, 1975), in that they can 
manifest information to others in order to get them to recognize their desires and do 
what they want (Strawson, 1964). But, if both humans and primates are able to 
understand others as intentional agents, only humans appear to have the motivation and 
cognitive skills to share intentions. Whereas primates do not manifest or recognize 
communicative intentions, such as the providing of information that is not immediately 
related to any perceivable goal of the “speaker”, humans, by contrast, engage in 
collaborative interactions where a goal is shared and actions are co-ordinated in the 
pursuit of this goal. Thus, humans seem to have a unique disposition to read other’s 
intentional states, and to share information and attention in a way that close primate 
relatives like chimpanzees do not (Tomasello et al., in press).  
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 In addition, the ability of language-trained chimpanzees to understand 
conditional expressions has only been demonstrated in an instrumental domain, where 
their keeper tells them (through a visual symbol system) that if they perform a certain 
action they will get a reward (Premack, 1976). From the chimpanzee’s point of view the 
conditional rule could be regarded as a kind of indication from the keeper that allows 
her to form a plan to obtain a reward. Consequently, we need to better understand the 
goal-directed functions of logical expressions (e.g. instructions, advice, promises, and 
threats) and their use in co-ordinating planning in order to identify both continuities and 
differences between humans and other primates.  
If pragmatics (intentional communication) of the kind shared with other primates 
is first, and semantics (truth-functionality) is second, logic and probability words (e.g. 
If, because, some, few, possible, unlikely) may be expected to have social functions built 
into their everyday use, besides their truth-functional definition. Specifically, we argue 
that the logical vocabulary of natural language has its origins in the necessity of 
achieving successful co-ordination of social interactions through communication, and is 
very well adapted to communicating perceptions of risk, danger and opportunity. From 
this perspective, sentences using logic expressions can be conceived as utterances 
aiming to get the hearer to do things, called performative utterances, rather than as 
statements merely describing states of affairs, called constative statements (cf. Austin, 
1962). 
These performative functions of logic words may be primary. Consider the 
following statements: 
(1) If there are few wolves in the West valley then don’t hunt there. 
(2) If there are a few wolves in the West valley then don’t hunt there. 
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The difference in meanings between (1) and (2) cannot be explained by the truth 
conditions of their respective antecedents: they describe similar proportions and are thus 
identical in this regard (Moxey & Sanford, 1993a;b). Instead, such a difference can 
easily be apprehended by considering the different utilities the speaker attaches to the 
presence of wolves (wolves as meat, i.e., positive utility, vs. wolves as predators, i.e. 
negative utility). Such utilities will serve as a reason for the recommended course of 
action.  
Rationality is defined here in terms of successful social co-ordination, which 
entails the correct perception and execution of the other’s intentions. This definition 
contrasts with the verificationist criterion of being a correct description of an objective 
reality. Our concept of social rationality is also different to the two kinds of rationality 
defined by Evans and Over (1996). These authors define individual rationality either in 
terms of reasoning according to formal principles (e.g., Bayes’ theorem) or in terms of 
satisfying instrumental goals. Social rationality is not concerned with formal principles, 
although socially rational judgments can overlap with formally correct judgments. 
Neither is social rationality to be identified with instrumental rationality, which can be 
quite asocial, as the fulfilling of one’s instrumental goals may not need any 
understanding of or co-ordinating with the goals of others. 
We have argued that successful social co-ordination is necessary for collectives 
to achieve their goals. In order to illustrate this claim, we will begin by examining the 
case of conditional directives whereby a principal directs an agent on how to behave in 
a hypothetical situation. We will then extend our analysis of conversational action 
planning to quantifiers and uncertainty expressions. 
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A Goal-based Approach to Performative Conditionals 
“If you see a leopard, run for your life.” “If someone cannot show you a VIP 
pass, throw him out the VIP lounge.” Conditional directives are performatives in that, 
should a hypothetical situation arise, their aim is to bring about a change in the world, a 
change that is desired by a principal and executed by an agent. In contrast, most work 
on the psychology of reasoning has examined constative conditionals (in the sense of 
Austin, 1962) such as indicatives and counterfactuals (see Evans & Over, in press, for 
an overview), which take truth-values as more-or- less true descriptions of the world. 
To this aim, we propose a simple conversational action planning (CAP) model 
whereby a principal (speaker) communicates his or her preferences to an agent (hearer) 
about what to do in a particular situation. In the language of signal detection theory, the 
model suggests that different formulations of the conditional relation (e.g., If event then 
action, If and only if event then action, If not-event then not action, Action only if event) 
will be used as a function of the relative costs of misses (MS: not taking the action when 
it is rational to do so) and false alarms (FA: taking the action when it is not rational to 
do so), as each conditional formulation implicitly conveys the preference of the speaker 
(principal). 
For example, consider the following three instructions: 
(3) If there is suspect baggage, then take it out and search it. 
(4) [If and] Only if there is suspect baggage, then search it. 
(5) If there is no suspect baggage, then do not search it. 
The CAP model predicts that a principal in the position of an airport security 
chief whose primary concern is to stop life-threatening baggage getting though 
security checks, will prefer to issue the instruction (3) to airport security agents. If, 
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however, his main concern is not to make passengers wait too long, he should prefer 
to utter (4) or (5). Results supporting this prediction are reported in Hilton, 
Kemmelmeier, and Bonnefon (2001). 
Hilton et al. (2001) also present evidence that agents (hearers) are quite 
capable of inferring what they are expected to do from the conditional instruction 
alone, even when the context is neutral about what the desirable action to take is. 
For example, in one scenario participants were asked to imagine that they were shop 
assistants whose boss had told them either: If a customer is touching some clothes, 
offer him your help, If and only if a customer is touching some clothes, offer him our 
help, Offer a customer your help only if he is touching some clothes, and If a 
customer is not touching any clothes, do not offer him your help. For any given 
formulation, participants were asked either to suppose P (The customer is touching 
the clothes) or to suppose not-P (the customer is not touching the clothes) and 
indicated their understanding with regard to Q (offer help) by choosing one of the 
three following answers: “I must do Q”, “I must not do Q”, “I am free to decide 
what to do.”  
Although nothing was said explicitly in the scenario to this effect, the shop 
assistant may infer that her boss may either be concerned about the cost of missing the 
opportunity to close sales with interested customers (through not offering help when a 
customer is touching the clothes, avoid-MS), or the cost of false alarms which frighten 
customers away by being too pushy (through offering help when it is not desired, avoid-
FA). 
Each conditional formulation appears to be informative with respect to what is 
required of the agent. Thus the dominant pattern elicited by if P then Q is that one must 
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do Q when P is the case, but is free to decide what to do when P is not the case. Hence, 
this formulation succeeds in avoiding MSs, yet leaves opened the possibility of a FA. 
The dominant pattern elicited by if and only if P then Q is that one must do Q when P is 
the case, and one must not do Q when P is not the case. This formulation is thus 
interpreted in a way which prevents both MSs and FAs. The dominant pattern elicited 
by if notP then notQ is that one is free to decide what to do when P is the case, but one 
must not do Q when P is not the case. This formulation thus prevents FAs but leaves 
opened the possibility of a MS. Finally, the formulation Q only if P elicits both patterns 
attached to if notP then notQ and if and only if P then Q. Thus, this formulation always 
prevents FAs but only sometimes prevents MSs.  
These results thus showed that conditional directives can be varied to express 
the principal’s preferences about what an agent should do should a hypothetical 
situation arise. We may speculate that speakers will choose one logically equivalent 
formulation of a causal conditional over another as a function of the speaker’s goals. 
For example, two people may share a causal model in which serving high quality 
products is a recipe for customer satisfaction in restaurants. But momentary changes 
in context-determined utilities (e.g., in the kinds of clients that are expected that 
evening) may require that this shared recipe be significantly nuanced in its 
application: a chef instructing a buyer will say If the meat is 80% lean then buy it 
when he is most concerned with the attaining a desirable goal (serving excellent 
food in a restaurant), but say If the meat is 20% fat then don’t buy it when most 
concerned with the costs of a mistake (serving substandard food in a restaurant). So 
even though both conditionals have the same truth-values, we argue that they will 
have different performative functions because they express different preferences. 
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Note that it would be anomalous to express the principal’s preferences 
probabilistically, for example by saying If the customer is touching clothes, then 
probably offer him your help. It is the principal’s responsibility and not the agent’s to 
assume the risk that the instruction may backfire. On the other hand, it seems that the 
principal could readily use probabilistic qualifications with constative conditionals in 
these kinds of situation: for example, the statement If the customer is touching clothes, 
then he would probably like your help does not sound anomalous. Intuitively, where the 
boss accepts that it is the assistant’s right to decide what to do in this case (and take 
responsibility for the outcome), such a formulation could readily be used as a piece of 
indirect advice. More generally, it seems to us that probabilistic advice can be 
appropriately given when the speaker wishes to help the hearer make the correct 
decision, but does not want to impose a solution directly. Be low, we turn to 
consideration of a study of how the conversational action planning model can be applied 
to advice using quantifiers and probability expressions. 
 Advice on What to Do Under Uncertainty: Pragmatic Functions of Quantifiers 
and Probability Words 
Everyday experts and novices alike use words and phrases to characterize 
quantities and uncertainty. A reservation clerk may tell his clients that few seats are left 
on the plane they wish to take or alternatively that there are a few seats left; a doctor 
may tell his patients that recovery is highly likely or alternatively, that it is not certain 
that they will recover. What will determine the professional adviser’s choice of word? 
What inferences may the recipient of the advice draw on the basis of this choice?  
Research aiming at understanding how people select and understand quantifiers 
was based on the assumption that they denote vague numerical quantities (Hakel, 1969; 
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Pepper & Prytulak, 1974) and that probability phrases denote vague numerical 
probabilities (Beyth-Marom, 1982; Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967), often formalised as 
membership functions (Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth, 1986). 
Leaving aside general problems with the membership function approach (Weber & 
Hilton, 1990), we concentrate our attention here on what might lead a speaker to select 
one word over another which denotes the same vague quantity. 
Advice-giving and the Choice of Quantity and Uncertainty phrases  
Consider a scenario (Villejoubert and Hilton, 2004) in which a travel agent 
wishes to help her client take the best decision about whether to book a ticket quickly 
(with the risk of taking a less-than- ideal flight) or to take his time about his decision 
(with the risk of booking too late to get a seat). Depending on the experimental 
condition, the clerk disposes of two pieces of information that can influence her choice 
of quantifier; the knowledge that there are 15 or 45 seats left on a 120-seat plane, and 
that these seats will normally be sold out in 2 or 14 days. The airlines scenario 
represents a particular case of the general decisional context presented in Figure 1.  
Here, the action consists in buying the plane tickets straight away and the status 
quo consists in delaying the purchase. If the tickets are bought straight away, the 
probability p1 of success is 1 (i.e., there is no longer a risk of losing the seats and p2 = 
0), the outcome corresponds to the tickets bought, which bears utility u1. If the purchase 
is delayed, the customer may or may not be able to buy tickets and has to bear the costs 
of a miss. In case of a correct rejection, the delay of the purchase is followed by the 
possibility of buying tickets, with the probability p3 where 0 = p3 < 1. The tickets 
bought at a later time have utility u3 and u3 > u1 (i.e., the adviser knows that the 
customer prefers to delay his purchase). But, in the case of a miss, the delay of the 
  Creating Collective Value  14 
purchase may also be followed by the impossibility of buying the tickets, with a 
probability p4 where 0 = p4 < 1, and no associated utility (u4 = 0). Figure 2 summarizes 
this context.  
An experiment was conducted in which participants were presented with a 
choice between two pieces of advice. The first piece of advice was a warning against the 
consequences of the status quo: “Be careful, it is possible that you won’t have time to 
make a decision because there are … seats available.” The second piece of advice 
encouraged the client to delay his decision: “Don’t worry, you have time to make your 
decision because there are … seats available.” Results showed that the time left to 
decide (14 days vs. 2 days) had a strong effect on a measure of the perceived risk that 
the seats would be sold out. In line with this, it was found that when clients had 14 days 
to decide, the number of seats left influenced the polarity of the quantifier word chosen. 
When there were 45 seats left, participants were more likely to use positive polarity 
words to encourage their clients to take their time because there were a few, quite a few, 
or many seats left. However, when clients had only 2 days to decide, participants almost 
exclusively used negative polarity words and warned them to decide quickly because 
there were few, very few, or not many seats left, regardless of whether the actual number 
was 15 or 45. In our view, these results illustrate our thesis that quantifiers in these 
situations are principally selected on the basis of their pragmatic function (encouraging 
vs. discouraging a putative course of action) rather than in terms of how well they 
describe some objectively given quantity.  
These results were replicated with a more complex scenario involving a doctor 
advising his patient on whether or not to undertake a surgical operation. Participants 
were about three and a half times as likely to choose a negative probability phrase when 
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the miss outcome (i.e., the negative consequence following the absence of action) was 
more severe than the false-alarm outcome (i.e., the negative consequence following the 
action). These results provide substantial support for our claim that the choice of 
polarity words is driven by the perceived utility of the action outcome, and that this 
utility is itself determined by comparison to the utility of the status quo, which serves as 
a reference point. 
Receiving Advice: Felicity and Emotional Response 
The preceding results concerned the analysis of the speaker’s use of quantifiers 
and probability words. The CAP model, however, also has implications for the 
understanding of the hearer’s interpretations of these words. Consider once more the 
example of the airlines clerk who warns her client that he should make his booking 
sooner rather than later because they are few seats left on the plane he wishes to take. 
From a semantic perspective, one would merely expect that the client would assign a 
vague quantity to the number of seats left based on his personal membership function 
for the quantifier “a few”. By contrast, we characterised good advice as a successful 
coordination between the speaker and the hearer. From this perspective, we can also 
assume that a given piece of advice will give rise to specific non-numerical expectations 
from the hearer. Thus, in the airlines example, the client should draw specific 
implicatures about the context within which this advice is taking place.  
We hypothesized that the extent to which such expectations are later fulfilled 
should in turn affect the client’s degree of satisfaction and emotional response both to 
the outcome of his decision and to the clerk’s advice. Thus, if the advice is felicitous 
(i.e., if it recommends the best action to satisfy the hearer’s goal in a given context), 
hearers should feel happier and more satisfied, independently of the type of the decision 
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outcome (i.e., correct rejection or hit). Conversely, non-felicitous pieces of advice 
should entail lesser degrees of happiness and satisfaction as they will lead to either a 
miss or a false alarm outcome.  
Another experiment was conducted in order to test these predictions. The 
experiment again used the airlines and surgeon scenarios, but this time participants had 
to take the role of the recipient of the advice. Half the participants were told the clerk 
indicated there were few seats left. They were then asked to imagine that they bought 
the plane ticket straight away and realised two days later that there were no seats left 
(i.e., that the advice was felicitous) or that there were still seats left (i.e., that the advice 
was not felicitous). The other ha lf were told that the clerk indicated there were a few 
seats left on the plane and were asked to imagine that they subsequently delayed the 
purchase of their ticket. Here again the felicity of this advice was manipulated by telling 
participants either that there were seats available two days later (felicitous advice) or 
that there were not (infelicitous advice). 
The estimated proportions of seats left on the plane were independent of the 
quantifier used in the advice. However, as in the previous experiment, the perceived risk 
of losing a seat was significantly higher when participants were told that they were “few 
seats” left (as opposed to “a few seats”). All participants were then asked to indicate 
their emotional state and their satisfaction following the realisation that there were (or 
not) seats available two days later. Results showed that people felt happiest, most 
satisfied, and least regretful when the advice was felicitous, independently of the actual 
advice (i.e., encouraged or warned against delay). Participants felt significantly less 
happy, less satisfied, and more regretful when they were encouraged to buy without 
delay but were then told that there were still tickets available two days later. However, 
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they were least happy, least satisfied, and most regretful when they were encouraged to 
delay their purchase only to realise that there were no seats left two days later. Felicity 
of the advice also determined their emotions towards the reservation clerk. They felt 
happy towards the clerk as long as her advice was felicitous (independently of whether 
he advised to act or to delay action). Conversely, participants felt significantly less 
happy towards the clerk when her advice was not felicitous. 
These results thus provide additional support for the social rationality 
hypothesis. Namely, when choosing to frame her advice with a positive or negative 
quantifier, the speaker is eliciting certain expectations in the recipient of this advice. 
The successful fulfilment of these expectations leads to goal satisfaction and in turn 
mediates the recipient’s degree of happiness, satisfaction and his perceived regret as 
well as his emotional response to his advisor.  
Conclusion 
Many would point to the unique human mastery of logic and mathematics as a 
major explanation of the success of the species. But without wishing to minimise the 
importance of the representational power of abstract symbolic systems for human 
engineering and computer science, we believe that logical vocabulary has pragmatic 
functions that make it essential to co-operation and planning in the face of uncertainty. 
The prevalence of these pragmatic nuances, and their nuisance value for those who wish 
to use these words to signify abstract logical and mathematical operations, suggests to 
us that natural human reasoning emerges from these kinds of co-operative interactions.    
The encouragement/discouragement perspective we have presented for 
conditional instructions and advice using quantifiers and probability expressions is quite 
general. For example, it could predict patterns of conditional advice : When the costs of 
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misses are high we predict advice of the kind: If you have this operation you should 
preserve your sight whereas if the costs of false alarms are high we predict advice of the 
kind If you don’t have this operation you may lose your sight. Observation of such 
patterns of response will show equivalence between ways of expressing uncertainty and 
conditionals: They are fundamentally causal arguments for or against a course of action, 
and their expressed strength and direction reside in the degree to which the speaker 
wishes to encourage or discourage the action in question. 
We have introduced a specific kind of instrumental rationality – that of 
successful co-ordination of social interactions. We have argued that for intersubjective 
conditionals a rational choice of a conditional formulation from the speaker’s 
perspective will normally be one that promotes her interests by getting the hearer to 
understand what she wants. For a hearer, a rational interpretation will normally be one 
that best represents the speaker’s intention (whether the hearer decides to do as the 
speaker wishes or not). Rationality comes to be defined here in terms of successful 
social co-ordination, and justified in terms of collective benefits (cf. Sperber, 2001). 
Recognizing the social rationality of conditionals allows a new perspective to be 
taken on their development and adaptive functions. It seems that performative 
conditional directives of the kind that we have studied emerge early in social interaction 
between caregivers and children (Luria, 1959). Children may in turn internalise external 
speech (Vygotsky, 1962) and appropriate it to regulate their own activity (Luria & la 
Yudovich, 1956). This perspective would seem to support Sperber’s (2001) argument 
that: “It is generally taken for granted that the logical and inferential vocabulary is – and 
presumably emerged – as tools for reflection and reasoning. From an evolutionary point 
of view, this is not particularly plausible. The hypothesis that they emerged as tools of 
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persuasion may be easier to defend.” 
Although evolutionary psychologists find it implausible that the human mind 
would have evolved some domain-general reasoning ability (e.g. Cosmides, 1989; 
Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992), it does seem to us that one plausible evolved general ability 
would be conversational skills that as speakers are needed to get others to see the point, 
and as hearers are needed to see what the speaker wishes them to do and to do it. 
Indeed, if these skills are integrated with general goal-based planning and reasoning 
strategies, then it would not be surprising that people reason especially well about 
propositions when they can see the point of them. 
Indeed, there is no doubt that, although there are many social animals, humans 
are among the most social. Many characteristics of the human mind may thus have 
evolved to facilitate social interaction and cooperation, for such interactions and 
cooperation enhanced the survival prospects of early humans. Hence, the capacity for 
logic may have emerged as a social phenomenon long before it became a scientific one. 
While truth-values may not constitute the building bricks for the human mind, the value 
of shared viewpoints does seem to provide the cement for building collective minds. 
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Figure Captions  
Figure 1. Formal representation of the decision to act. 
Figure 2. Formal representation of the Airlines scenario context.
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
